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Abstract 
 
Canadian scholarship has detailed the impact of increasing American political, economic, and socio-cultural 
influences on post-Second World War Canada. This paper demonstrates that the Canadian Army was likewise 
influenced by the Americans, and changes to the army’s professional military education are evidence of the 
“Americanization” of the army. During the early Cold War period, Canadian Army staff officer education increasingly 
incorporated United States Army doctrine, ranging from the basic organization of American formations to complex 
future military strategy. Research is primarily based on the annual staff course syllabi at the Canadian Army Staff 
College in Kingston, Ontario, which indicate that Canadian Army leaders were sensitive not only to the realities of 
fighting alongside the Americans in a future war, but to the necessity of making the Canadian Army, previously 
historically and culturally a British army, compatible with its American counterpart. In the context of limited scholarship 
on the early Cold War Canadian Army, this paper advances the argument that the army’s intellectual capacity to 
wage war was largely determined by external influences. 
 
During the first decade after the Second World War, Canadian society underwent a distinct transition. 
While Canada’s various linguistic and ethnic groups — including the English-speaking majority – did not 
sever their connections to the Old World, Americans’ involvement in Canadian politics, economics, and 
arts and literature was increasingly evident. Scholars have well documented Canada’s shift from trans-
Atlantic to greater American connections; evidence includes the findings of the 1951 Massey Report on 
American popular media in Canada, and the 1957 Gordon Report on the extensive American ownership 
of Canadian industry.1 Similarly, the tightening post-war Canada-United States defence relationship has 
                                                 
1 Launched in 1949, the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, chaired by 
Vincent Massey, found significant Canadian contributions to Canada’s post-war cultural resources stifled by those 
from the United States. The “paperback revolution” of the early 1950s exemplified this situation, being monopolized 
largely by American publishers and American-controlled book suppliers who were blamed for the suppression of 
Canadian literary talent. See Canada, Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 
Report (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1951); and Donald Creighton, The Forked Road: Canada 1939-1957 (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1976), 180-87. Similarly, the Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects issued two reports: a 
preliminary one in 1956, and a final one in 1957 named after the Commission’s chair, Walter L. Gordon. Canada, 
Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects, Preliminary Report (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1956); and Canada, 
Royal Commission on Canada’s Economic Prospects, Final Report (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958). These reports 
showed that a “North American continental economy, largely owned, controlled, and directed by Americans, had 
definitely come into existence; and its dominion extended, though somewhat unevenly, over a wide range of 
economic activities in Canada” (Creighton, The Forked Road, 259). 
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received its fair share of scholarship.2 However, describing how Canada’s shift, with its transnational 
influences, affected the Canadian military services’ intellectual development remains fertile ground for 
research. Specifically, Canadian Army staff officer education during the early Cold War period (1946-
1956) demonstrates the army’s transition from a purely British mindset to an “Americanized” one. 
During that period, Canadian Army senior officers increasingly sought to integrate American 
doctrine into post-war staff course curricula. Their medium was the new Canadian Staff College (later 
named the Canadian Army Staff College, or CASC), established in 1946 in Kingston, Ontario. At the 
CASC,3 captains, majors, and lieutenant-colonels qualified as staff officers who were responsible for the 
timely planning of an operation and pooling of resources to successfully execute it. The main reason for 
this American emphasis in the staff course was that the army began to prepare officers for the likelihood 
of fighting future wars alongside American armed forces and/or under higher US military command, 
scenarios that had happened, to a limited extent, during the Second World War. This situation was best 
illustrated by specific CASC curricula – the précis (curriculum documents), lectures, demonstrations, and 
exercises on US Army formations and logistics and their compatibility with Canadian Army counterparts.  
This article differs from studies that focus on the issues conventionally linked to the Americanization 
of the Canadian military — such as Canadian officers’ desire for US-made weapons and equipment — 
and introduces a new dimension to the “transgovernmental linkages” that boosted the Americanization 
of the Canadian armed forces during the Cold War by contending for the importance of staff officer 
education in that process.4 The Americanization of early Cold War Canadian Army staff officer education 
is significant in the intellectual history of Canada’s modern army because the new staff college’s 
organization and curriculum were originally modelled after British Army institutions, yet came to 
incorporate many American elements. 
Beginning in the late 1800s, the Canadian Militia, as the army was known, was designed to fight as a 
British force under British command. A British General Officer Commanding (GOC) led the Militia, 
which was divided into part-time citizen-soldiers and a smaller, full-time Permanent Force (PF).5 At the 
turn of the twentieth century, GOCs undertook to organize the Canadian Militia into a modern army to 
better serve imperial defence, including against an American invasion of Canada.6 Canadian Militia staff 
                                                 
2 For example, see John English and Norman Hillmer, “Canada’s American Alliance,” in Partners Nevertheless: 
Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1989), 
32-42; J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worse: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: 
Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), 163-91; John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: 
Ambivalent Allies (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), 178-99; Joseph T. Jockel, No 
Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 1987); George Lindsey, “Canada-U.S. Defense Relations in the Cold War,” in Fifty Years of Canada-United States 
Defense Cooperation: The Road From Ogdensburg, eds. Joel J. Sokolsky and Joseph T. Jockel (Lewiston, NY: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1992), 59-82; Danford W. Middlemiss, “Defence Cooperation,” in Partners Nevertheless, 167-93; and C.P. 
Stacey, 1921-1948: The Mackenzie King Era, vol. 2 of Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian External Policies 
(Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1981), 406-13. 
3 A table of acronyms is included at the end of this article. 
4 For a representative study of the conventional view on the Americanization of the Canadian armed forces, see J.L. 
Granatstein, “The American Influence on the Canadian Military, 1939-1963,” Canadian Military History 2, 1 (1993): 63-
73, quote from page 71. “Transgovernmental linkages” refers to those formal and informal links that had developed 
and been strengthened between the Canadian and American militaries from the Second World War onwards.  
5 Captain M.V. Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945” (master’s thesis, Royal 
Military College of Canada, 1978), 28-31; and Howard G. Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl: Canada’s Army and 
Staff Education (1946-1995)” (PhD diss., Queen’s University, 2010), 42n2. 
6 Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 54-55; Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of Professional Army, 
1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988), 62-64; and Richard A. Preston, The Defence of the Undefended 
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officer education was introduced in 1899 through a special four-month staff course at the Royal Military 
College of Canada (RMC) in Kingston. It was patterned on the curriculum at the British Army Staff 
College at Camberley, England.7  
British Army reforms following the Second Boer War in South Africa (1899-1902) boosted the 
Canadian Militia’s modernization, specifically the introduction of a General Staff. Headed by a Chief of 
the General Staff (CGS), this group of senior staff officers, devoted wholly to war plans and operations, 
was part of a new staff system that included officers responsible for the logistical support of army forces.8 
A Canadian staff system was established in 1904, with Canadian officers eligible to become CGS (who 
replaced the British GOC). British officials also encouraged staff officer exchanges throughout the Empire 
to standardize imperial military thinking, and arrangements were made for the annual attendance of a 
small number of Canadian army officers at Camberley.9 
The Canadian Militia adopted a British Army staff system consisting of a General Staff (G) Branch 
responsible for operational matters, an Adjutant General (A) Branch responsible for personnel issues 
(including pay, promotion, records, and medical matters), and a Quartermaster General (Q) Branch that 
dealt with items including supply, ordnance, equipment, weapons, and transportation. G Branch 
proposed operations and A and Q Branches carried them out, within resource limitations. Under A and Q 
guidance, a field formation’s “services” (including supply, transport, and medical units) enabled the 
“arms” (for example, infantry, artillery, and armour units) to fight. Within corps, divisions, and brigades, 
A and Q Branches were combined as one (AQ). 
As this paper deals primarily with divisions, an explanation of the divisional staff will suffice. The 
division’s senior G Branch officer, the General Staff Officer Grade One (GSO 1), was a lieutenant-colonel 
responsible for the planning and execution of operations, orders, training, and intelligence. He delegated 
duties to four immediate subordinates, two GSO 2s (majors) and two GSO 3s (captains). The senior AQ 
officer, the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AA & QMG), was a lieutenant-colonel whose 
                                                                                                                                                             
Border: Planning for War in North America 1867-1939 (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1977), 
152-63. 
7 Opened in 1799, the college at Camberley was first known as the Senior Department of the Royal Military College 
(UK). In 1857, it was renamed the Staff College and the first course under this new title began 1 April 1858. Philip 
Sherratt, “Camberley — Its History,” Annual Review - Canadian Army Staff College 1, 1 (1952): 46. These changes were 
part of the British Army’s post-Crimean War (1854-1856) reforms to rectify its poor performance in that conflict. 
Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 48. On the course at RMC, see Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of 
Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945,” 31-32; Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 56-57; Harris, Canadian Brass, 79-
80; and John A. Macdonald, In Search of Veritable: Training the Canadian Army Staff Officer, 1899 to 1945 (Ottawa: 
National Library of Canada, 1994), 61-62. 
8 In the early nineteenth century, continental European powers developed headquarters staffs to meet the demands 
of Napoleonic-era warfare, particularly the need to effectively command and control mass armies. For peculiar 
geographical, political, and military reasons, the British resisted the adoption of the General Staff until the early 
twentieth century. Prior to the implementation of an operational staff, the British Army maintained a less formal 
system, in which a General Officer Commanding a field formation oversaw an administrative staff. Bezeau, “The 
Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945,” 5-18; and Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 45-
53.  
9 Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945,” 33-35; Coombs, “In Search of 
Minerva’s Owl,” 58-59; Harris, Canadian Brass, 70-79; Lieutenant-Colonel Bernd Horn, “Lost Opportunity: The Boer 
War Experience and its Influence on British and Canadian Military Thought,” in Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the 
Canadian Military Experience, ed. Bernd Horn (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2002), 92-93, 96; and 
Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 63-67. For the political-military development of the early Canadian Militia, see 
Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia 1868-1904 (Toronto and Buffalo: University 
of Toronto Press, 1970). 
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three subordinates handled A, Q, and Movement (of supplies and personnel) respectively.10 The British 
staff was based on the nineteenth-century Prusso-German staff system composed of three groups of 
officers that dealt with operations, personnel, and supply. By contrast, in the French and American- 
developed “continental staff system,” a Chief of Staff coordinated for the commanding officer all 
operational and administrative duties within a single General Staff.11 
Early imperial staff officer education was designed to make Empire army officers interchangeable 
between each other’s staffs. Beginning in 1907, Canadian applicants to Camberley undertook a special 
short course at RMC to prepare them for the entrance examinations for the British institution.12 By the 
beginning of the First World War in 1914, three-to-four Canadians attended Camberley annually. When 
that conflict interrupted these arrangements, Canadian officers gained wartime experience as “staff 
learners” on three-month appointments with British formation headquarters or took an abbreviated 
junior staff course in England.13 In the Interwar period, more Canadians headed to Camberley and, from 
1926 on, to another British Army Staff College at Quetta, India.14  
For Canadian officers, education at Camberley and Quetta was the route to senior command in the 
Militia PF.15 Appointments at other prestigious imperial institutions also helped.16 Canadian army 
officers’ intellectual abilities were also sharpened by military writing that were often debates amongst 
each other in service journals.17 The most well-known debate was in the Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ) 
between April 1938 and July 1939. E.L.M. Burns, a lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Canadian Engineers, 
and G.G. Simonds, an artillery captain, wrote five articles contending for their respective standpoints on 
the proper coordination of tanks and infantry in combat. Typical of Canadian military writing in the 
Interwar period, this debate centred on the application of British Army doctrine in a Canadian context.18 
                                                 
10 Kenneth Radley, We Lead, Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell 
Publishing Limited, 2006), 182-85. 
11 For the British “staff diarchy,” German “triarchical” approach, and French “bureau”/American continental staff, 
see Major Paul Johnston, “Staff Systems and the Canadian Air Force: Part 1 History of the Western Staff System,” The 
Canadian Air Force Journal 1, 2 (2008): 21-22, 26-29. 
12 Bezeau, “The Role and Organization of Canadian Military Staffs 1904-1945,” 41; Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s 
Owl,” 60; and Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 68. 
13 E.L.M. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970), 62; 
Paul D. Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar (Toronto and Buffalo: University 
of Toronto Press, 2007), 55; and Radley, We Lead, Others Follow, 181, 205-206. 
14 An Ex-Cadet, “The Staff College, Quetta,” Royal Military College of Canada Review and Log of H.M.S. Stone Frigate 
XXIX, no. 52 (1948): 25; and Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 66, 68. 
15 James Eayrs, From the Great War to the Great Depression, vol. 1 of In Defence of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1964), 88; and Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 79. 
16 For example, the UK’s Imperial Defence College, was established in 1927 for the purpose of educating British 
Empire/Commonwealth senior military and civil service officers in the higher direction of Commonwealth defence. 
Burns, General Mud, 85-86; Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 68; Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 96; 
Harris, Canadian Brass, 194; Maurice Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1962), 98; and Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simonds, CB, CBE, DSO, “The Imperial Defence College,” 
Royal Military College of Canada Review and Log of H.M.S. Stone Frigate XXIX, 52 (1948): 33. 
17 “Note to File – The Canadian Army and its Journals,” Canadian Army Journal 8, 2 (2005): 99. 
18 Lieut.-Colonel E.L.M. Burns, “A Division That Can Attack,” Canadian Defence Quarterly XV, 3 (1938): 282-98; 
Captain G.G. Simonds, “An Army that can Attack – a Division that can Defend,” Canadian Defence Quarterly XV, 4 
(1938): 413-17; Burns, “Where Do The Tanks Belong?” Canadian Defence Quarterly XVI, 1 (1938): 28-31; Simonds, 
“What Price Assault Without Support?” Canadian Defence Quarterly XVI, 2 (1939): 142-47; and Simonds, “The Attack,” 
Canadian Defence Quarterly XVI, 4 (1939): 379-90. See also J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior 
Commanders in the Second World War (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2005), 125, 151; and Coombs, “In Search of 
Minerva’s Owl,” 66-67. 
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The Canadian Militia was a British organization and Canadian officers prepared to fight the next war 
alongside British forces. Their professional mindset was imbued with British Army doctrine, their British 
intellectual and social connections reinforced.19 In the Second World War, many of these men became the 
Canadian Army’s senior commanders and staff officers, including Generals A.G.L. McNaughton (the 
army’s first commanding officer), H.D.G. Crerar (army commander at war’s end), Burns (corps 
commander), Simonds (corps commander), and Maurice Pope (military staff officer to the prime 
minister).20 
Historically, Canadians’ military relationship with the Americans took a different path. Well into the 
1930s, military planners on both sides of the border examined the possibility of war between Canada and 
the United States, despite generally amicable political and social relations between the civilians of both 
countries. Even military-industrial collaboration during the First World War did not result in an 
immediate military alliance.21 The rise of Nazi power in Europe changed this situation. In the late 1930s, 
the US president and the Canadian prime minister publicly promised mutual assistance in continental 
defence, and secret discussions on mutual defence problems were held. However, permanent military 
liaison between the two countries was not established until after the German conquest of Western Europe 
in early 1940. The North American government leaders’ Ogdensburg Declaration that August created the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence that was the formal mechanism for the regular exchange of military 
information and consideration of continental defence.22 
Meanwhile, Canada’s armed forces began a rapid expansion which left the army with a shortage of 
staff officers. More trained staff officers were needed than those found within the existing army structure, 
and the British staff colleges alone could not meet the demand.23 As a result, Canadian officials 
established their own Canadian Junior War Staff Course, first held in January 1941 in England, to qualify 
40-50 Canadian officers as GSO 3. This course was led by then-Lieutenant-Colonel Simonds, who 
designed it as a truncated Camberley staff course.24 Beginning in July 1941, RMC hosted subsequent staff 
courses to the end of the war, a total of nineteen overall. Initially sixteen weeks long, the RMC wartime 
courses were increased to six months duration.25  
                                                 
19 Burns, General Mud, 89-90, 93-94; Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General, 73-77; Eayrs, From the Great War to the 
Great Depression, 89; Dominick Graham, The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds (Toronto: Stoddart, 
1993), 26-32; Harris, Canadian Brass, 203-206; Pope, Soldiers and Politicians, 53, 153; and John Swettenham, 1887-1939, 
vol. 1 of McNaughton (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1968), 190-93.  
20 For the military careers of these generals and others, and the connection between their staff college education and 
wartime service, see Granatstein, The Generals. 
21 Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945, United States 
Army in World War II: Special Studies (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 
Army, 1959), 1-2; Eayrs, From the Great War to the Great Depression, 70-78; and Preston, The Defence of the Undefended 
Border, 181-228. 
22 Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945, 3-30; James Eayrs, Appeasement and 
Rearmament, vol. 2 of In Defence of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 176-210; J.L. Granatstein, 
Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), 115-
16, 124-32; Preston, The Defence of the Undefended Border, 228-29; and C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War 
Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970), 96-99, 327-43. 
23 C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, vol. 1 of Official History of the Canadian 
Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 129, 140; and Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 101. 
24 Graham, The Price of Command, 55-57; and Granatstein, The Generals, 153-54. 
25 Lt.-Col. R.T. Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” Royal Military College of Canada Review and Log of H.M.S. Stone 
Frigate XXVIII, 51 (1947): 49; Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 77, 81-83; Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 101-
107; and Stacey, Six Years of War, 140, 237. The last wartime course ended in March 1946. Coombs, “In Search of 
Minerva’s Owl,” 94, Appendix F, “Chronology – Second World War Canadian War Staff Courses,” 355-56; and 
Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” 49. 
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In keeping with the army’s British heritage, the Canadian staff course followed wartime organization 
at Camberley. When the Camberley programme added an intermediate staff course to its senior and 
junior courses in 1942, the following year the Kingston course, renamed the Canadian War Staff Course 
(CWSC), was divided into Intermediate and Junior Wings. Similar to their British counterparts, these 
wings trained staff officers for appointments at field formation headquarters and static headquarters, 
respectively.26 Moreover, as at Camberley, classes of Canadian officers were divided into syndicates 
(small groups) of approximately ten students, with instructor officers facilitating group discussion of 
problems. Directing Staff (DS), composed of senior officers, ran the course and evaluated students’ work.  
The Canadian curriculum again mirrored the British course syllabus, which had two sections. In the 
first section, students worked through a variety of subjects that included basic staff duties, intelligence, 
equipment, current military affairs, and the preparation of appreciations and orders. The subjects 
focussed primarily on “the organization and employment of various army elements that constituted 
divisions or parts thereof in all types of military operations.”27 The second half of the course involved the 
resolution of tactical problems using command post exercises and tactical exercises without troops, in 
which DS assigned students to command and staff appointments (at corps, division, or brigade level) and 
gave them tactical missions (such as opposed river crossings). Students evaluated their mission, 
accounted for all factors affecting their plans, and issued orders accordingly, as in real battle situations. 
The course aimed to provide officers with the technical tools needed to manage battles and prepare 
soldiers for combat.28 
In the background to Anglo-Canadian army staff officer education, the Canada-US military 
relationship grew. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was one of three Canada-US strategic-level 
channels established during the Second World War. The other two were the exchange of air, naval, and 
army attachés between Ottawa and Washington, and the Canadian Joint Staff mission in Washington 
which liaised directly with a US Joint Chiefs of Staff committee on the coordination of strategic planning 
and joint military operations. The Joint Board, service attachés, and the Joint Staff formed the core of an 
increasingly closer wartime Canada-US military relationship, set within the greater context of 
cooperation on political, economic, scientific, and internal security matters.29 
These arrangements predicated similar cooperation on the battlefield. The Japanese threat to North 
America’s west coast necessitated joint defence efforts between Canada’s Pacific Command and the US 
Western Defense Command. The 1st Special Service Force, in which Canadian and American troops 
served together, and the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade were thereafter part of US amphibious forces that 
invaded the Japanese-held Aleutian island of Kiska in August 1943.30 The 1st Special Service Force also 
saw action in Italy and southern France. Late in the war, US Army divisions operated under Canadian 
command in Northwest Europe, and the Canadian Army Pacific Force began to mobilize for the invasion 
of Japan under higher US command and using US organization and equipment. Canadian and American 
                                                 
26 Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 107-108. See also Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 88; Preston, Canada’s 
RMC: A History of the Royal Military College (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 297; and Stacey, Six Years of 
War, 140. 
27 Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s Owl,” 88. 
28 Douglas E. Delaney, The Soldiers’ General: Bert Hoffmeister at War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 35-36; 
Granatstein, The Generals, 192; and Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 116-17, 127-28. 
29 Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945, 56-57, 71-76, 104, 280; Granatstein, 
Canada’s War, 132-48, 321-27; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 349-57. 
30 Kenneth H. Joyce, Snow Plough and Jupiter Deception: The True Story of the 1st Special Service Force and the 1st 
Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1942-1945 (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2006); Galen R. Perras, Stepping Stones to 
Nowhere: The Aleutian Islands, Alaska, and American Military Strategy, 1867-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
2003), 136-57; and Reginald H. Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., 
Through Two World Wars (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1977), 184-98. 
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soldiers also attended each other’s wartime tactical courses including cold weather training at Camp 
Shilo, Manitoba and parachute training at Fort Benning, Georgia, and they conducted three joint cold 
weather exercises in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba.31 
Additionally, beginning in April 1942, Canadian staff course instructors visited the US Army 
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The Fort Leavenworth courses 
consisted of a larger number of candidates, and instruction necessitated a greater amount of 
specialization in staff officer education than the British-style curriculum at RMC. Fort Leavenworth’s 
General Staff Course closely equated to the Canadian War Staff Course, in that it trained officers for 
appointments in particular staff sections. Four staff sections were in the US Army system: G-1 
(Personnel), G-2 (Intelligence), G-3 (Operations), and G-4 (Logistics).32 These connections between 
Kingston and Fort Leavenworth did not immediately influence Canadian Army staff officer education to 
a large extent. The CWSC curriculum included limited studies on the US Army. A typical example was 
CWSC Course No. 6, of which out of 676 total hours of study, only two and half were devoted to the US 
Army and its staff and training methods.33  
Before the war ended, Canadian Army leaders had decided that in peacetime, the majority of officers 
were to receive staff training. This new policy rendered the pre-war procedure of sending three or four 
officers per year to Camberley and Quetta inadequate. Therefore, a fledgling Canadian Staff College was 
established to provide the army with sufficient numbers of staff officers. The Canadian Staff College’s 
organization, instructional methods, and curriculum continued to reflect longstanding British traditions. 
The course’s primary purpose remained to produce the Canadian Army’s future senior staff officers and 
commanders.34 Specifically, the aim of the course, now a year in length, was “to train officers for second 
grade staff appointments in all branches of the staff in field and static formations in time of war.”35  
The staff college was a product of its international environment. Canadian Army officials viewed the 
institution as reflecting Canada’s recently acquired status as a middle power, and in particular one more 
independent of the British. As a member of the DS wrote in 1947: “[I]ndicative of the Dominion’s new 
position in Empire and world affairs, a Staff College of truly national flavour was conceived and duly 
authorized by Canadian Army Routine Order 6630 of June 17, 1946.”36 One result was that the college 
student body was greatly diversified during the early Cold War period. In addition to a staple of officers 
from the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), British Army, Indian Army, 
                                                 
31 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 391; and Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 
1939-1945, 280-81. 
32 Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 119-22. 
33 Ibid., Appendix VI, “CWSC COURSE SYLLABUS,” 301-302. 
34 Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa (LAC), Records of the Department of National Defence (RG 24), Box 1096, 
File 3300-81/1 Part 1 Training – Combined Operations – Canadian Army Staff College 1946-1947, “Chief of the 
General Staff to CNS [Chief of the Naval Staff] and CAS [Chief of the Air Staff],” 15 February 1946. See also George 
Stanley, “Military Education in Canada, 1867-1970,” in The Canadian Military: A Profile, ed. Hector J. Massey (Toronto: 
The Copp Clark Publishing Company, 1972), 187. 
35 Department of National Defence, Ottawa (DND), Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 80/71 Canadian 
Land Forces Command and Staff College Papers, Box 22, Folio 59, Volume 1 SERIES BRIEF 1952 Outline Block 
Syllabus 1952 Provisional Time-Tables Weekly Time-Tables Order of Battle and Code List RCAF Order of Battle Code 
Sign list Staff Tables Philistine Armed Forces, CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE (CASC) 1952 COURSE, 
“PROVISIONAL CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OUTLINE BLOCK SYLLABUS 1952 COURSE,” October 
1951, 1. See also Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” 49; DND, DHH, 80/71, 6, 17, Volume 3 AMPHIBIOUS 
OPERATIONS PLANNING NAVY, CASC 1948 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE AMPHIBIOUS 
OPERATIONS STUDY JOININING[sic] INSTRUCTIONS,” n.d., 2; “Editor’s Page,” Snowy Owl 1, 4 (1955): 12; and The 
Directorate of Public Relations (Army), “The Canadian Army Staff College,” Canadian Army Journal 4, 3 (1950): 48. 
36 Bennett, “The Canadian Staff College,” 49. 
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and US Army, over the next decade others came from the South African, French, Turkish, Norwegian, 
Belgian, Italian, Australian, and Pakistani Armies.37 The number of students averaged around 50 per year 
until 1952, when incoming classes were expanded to over 90. The tradition of officers attending allied 
professional military education institutions was not exclusive to the British Army staff colleges, but a 
widespread practice, especially after the Second World War. For the CASC, it was reinforced by and 
resulted from the creation of western alliances during those years, in particular the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). As an Italian officer who attended the 1952 CASC course stated:  
 
A firm alliance is built up on an understanding of different national 
mentalities, on the knowledge of our various military organizations and 
techniques and on the adherence to a common aim. Attendance at our 
two Staff Colleges [CASC and the Italian War School] on a reciprocal 
basis will greatly assist in achieving this aim.38 
 
The composition of the staff college’s instructional cadre, including the DS, was also influenced by 
the new post-war internationalism. Until 1952, the DS was composed of approximately a dozen officers; 
beginning that year, the DS was expanded to twenty officers or more, and remained at that number for 
the rest of the early Cold War period.39 During the Second World War, the Canadian staff courses were 
led by a mix of British and Canadian instructors, the latter including RCAF officers. Of 73 total DS that 
led Canadian wartime staff courses No. 1-11, thirteen were British Army and only one was US Army;40 no 
other US military servicemen provided instruction in Kingston during this time. By 1956, however, it was 
routine for the DS to annually include at minimum two serving US military officers, usually one US 
Marine Corps officer, and at least one US Army officer.41 As a result, for the ten early Cold War Canadian 
staff courses, 21 of 198 total instructors were American officers, compared to ten British officers over the 
same period.42 
                                                 
37 For example, while the Canadian Army was allotted at least 35 vacancies for the 1951 CASC course, the British 
Army, the US Army, and the RCAF were allotted two each, while the RCN, Australian Army, Indian Army, and 
Pakistani Army were allotted one each. Additionally, eight spaces were available for officers from “NATO 
countries.” LAC, RG 24, Box 5006, File 3310-81/1 Part 1 Courses – General – Canadian Army Staff College 1950-1954, 
“DCGS [Deputy Chief of the General Staff] to VCGS [Vice Chief of the General Staff],” 9 September 1950, 1-2. The 
author would like to thank Brigadier General Philip L. Bolte, US Army (retired), for drawing attention to this fact. 
Brigadier Bolte was a US student at the CASC in the mid-1960s. 
38 Enrico Comucci, “Sculo di Guerra,” Annual Review - Canadian Army Staff College 1, 1 (1952): 76. 
39 On CGS Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds’ request, Brigadier George Kitching became CASC Commandant and 
oversaw the expansion of the college’s facilities, DS, and student body. For an overview of Kitching’s activities in 
Kingston, see George Kitching, Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major-General George Kitching (Langley, BC: 
Battleline Books, 1986), 285-88. After his appointment as CGS in 1951, Simonds believed that the CASC was 
“operating at only about 50% of capacity” and he wanted sufficient staff officers to maintain both his projected 
peacetime army of approximately 50,000 personnel and a full corps in the event of mobilization for war (Ibid., 283-84, 
quote from page 284). Simonds had considerable expertise in Canadian professional military education; in addition 
to his pre-Second World War studies and wartime duties, Simonds had been a student, chief instructor, and acting 
commandant at the Imperial Defence College and then doubly appointed as commandant of both the National 
Defence College and CASC in Kingston. Graham, The Price of Command, 222-23, 230-33, 235, 238-39. 
40 “Directing Staff,” in Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 130, fig. 21. 
41 For example, see “DIRECTING, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 1956,” Snowy Owl 1, 5 (1956): 9.  
42 These numbers are calculated from “CASC/CLFCSC Instructors 1946-1973,” in Coombs, “In Search of Minerva’s 
Owl,” 141, table 6-1. Coombs’ figures include all instructor officers, not only those who served as DS. 
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The appointment of more American instructor officers at the CASC occurred within the contexts of 
the post-war continuation of Canada-US defence cooperation and the American-led NATO alliance. The 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence, for example, raised questions of standardization between the 
Canadian and US Armies, including military language, weapons, vehicles, and signal communications.43 
Canadian Army planners shared with both their American and British counterparts the belief that the 
next war would again be in Europe, and focused on the use of infantry and armoured divisions, à la 
Second World War, in numerous roles against the Soviet enemy. This belief was the foundation of NATO 
planning in the early 1950s for the defence of Western Europe. In the CASC curriculum, a section of 
studies was devoted to the command and staff work of infantry and armoured divisions in various 
phases of war, such as the attack, defence, withdrawal, and urban fighting. Exercises involved the 
theoretical employment of Canadian, British, and American army forces similar to those in the field at the 
end of the Second World War in Europe.44 The Canadian Army formations stationed in West Germany to 
defend Western Europe against Soviet invasion were likewise trained for all forms of land warfare 
alongside American and British counterparts.45  
The Korean War (1950-1953) reinforced the necessity of interoperability between the Canadian and 
US Armies. Canadian officers in Korea led their units and formations under both higher British and 
American command. The US Eighth Army, composed of corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions from 
numerous United Nations members, was the largest western field formation in Korea, and directed its 
multinational components against Communist Chinese and North Korean adversaries. The Canadian 
Army’s contribution was the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group (25 CIBG), composed of three 
infantry regiments and artillery, tank, and other support units. The first unit in theatre, an infantry 
battalion, fought as part of a British infantry brigade, which in turn was under a US Army division’s 
command. From mid-1951 to the July 1953 armistice, 25 CIBG joined British, Australian, and New 
Zealand army units in the 1st Commonwealth Division that was part of a US Army corps within US 
Eighth Army.46 
Additionally, the closer Canada–US military relationship in general, and the Korean War in 
particular, was reflected in professional army journals such as the Canadian Army Journal (CAJ). Although 
the CAJ’s content ultimately became almost wholly Canadian-written,47 articles from a variety of sources 
were often reprinted in this publication, including American-written articles or articles on American 
military topics connected to debates within the Canadian and British Armies. The Korean War generated 
a tri-national debate, one that focused on the same topic as Burns and Simonds had in the CDQ two 
                                                 
43 Dziuban, Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939-1945, 334-335; and DND, DHH, 80/71, 9, 26, 
Volume 12 UNITED STATES ARMY, CASC 1948 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED 
STATES ARMY - 4 QUESTIONNAIRE ORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION AND REGIMENT,” 
January 1948, 1. 
44 DND, DHH, 80/71, 15, 45, Volume 7 OPERATIONS WAR, CASC 1950 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF 
COLLEGE OPERATIONS WAR 1 INTRODUCTION TO SERIAL,” February 1950, 1-2; Ibid., “APPX A TO OPS WAR 
1 TABLE OF OPS WAR EXS,” n.d., 2; and Ibid., “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS WAR 
KEYSTONE 1 BRIEF PART II OPERATIONS WAR SERIAL,” June 1950, 1-3. 
45 Beginning in 1951, the Canadian Army contributed infantry brigade groups to NATO land forces. The brigade 
groups’ headquarters and field training directly paralleled CASC curriculum on the staff and command aspects of 
war operations and was “structured to achieve proficiency in all types of operations,” including advance to contact, 
deliberate attack, deliberate defence, withdrawal, and defence of a bridgehead. Sean M. Maloney, War Without Battles: 
Canada’s NATO Brigade in Germany 1951-1993 (Toronto and New York: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1997), 39. 
46 For the Canadian Army experience in Korea, see William C. Johnston, A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations 
in Korea (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003). A recent work on the US-led UN efforts in Korea is Allan R. Millett, The War 
for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010). 
47 Major Andrew B. Godefroy, “The Canadian Army Journal 1947-2007,” Canadian Army Journal 10, 3 (2007): 11. 
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decades before. This time, American, British, and Canadian officers expounded on the tactics and 
challenges of effective tank-infantry operations at the small unit level in mountainous Korean terrain.48 
The inclusion of American writings in the CAJ signalled Canadian Army officers’ shift away from a sole 
reliance on British doctrine and their recognition of the practical value of learning US Army doctrine. 
Canadian Army instructors therefore took steps to incorporate American doctrine into professional 
military education to enable staff officers to function alongside or under the command of the US Army in 
future wars. Their efforts, while not undermining the Anglo-Canadian staff system, enhanced Canadian 
officers’ capability to work with American counterparts. During the early Cold War period, Canadian 
Army staff officer education was helped by earlier connections established with the Command and 
General Staff College (CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, which had become “the pinnacle” of US Army officer 
education.49 While Colonel W.C. Dick, a Canadian graduate of Fort Leavenworth, served as CASC 
Director (August 1947–August 1950), Canadian DS were encouraged to again visit the US Army school 
and participate in an abbreviated version of a course of “platform presentations” required for all potential 
instructors at the CGSC. Staff from both the CASC and CGSC gained much “of mutual value,” and CASC 
instructors hoped again “to avail themselves of this excellent method for exchanging ideas.”50  
One result of the CASC-CGSC connections was that studies on the US Army formed a large 
proportion of the overall annual CASC curriculum. In general, studies on the US Army ranged from two 
to four months of the year-long course; at most, they were spread over eight months.51 First titled the US 
Army series and then, beginning in 1950, the US Armed Forces series, the aim of these studies was to 
“teach the organization and employment of the US Armed Forces, especially at the divisional and corps 
levels, with particular emphasis on staff techniques, command functions and logistic support.”52 
Broadly, the US Armed Forces series was composed of studies on the US Army, its formations, 
support units, logistics, and the roles of its General Staff sections. The CGSC was the primary source of 
this information, and the institution’s organizational structure and educational aspects were also part of 
the US Armed Forces series curriculum. In Kingston, a CGSC staff or faculty member frequently lectured 
on Fort Leavenworth’s mission and organization, with an emphasis on “current trends in US Army 
tactical concepts.”53 Additionally, beginning in 1951, a CGSC tutorial exercise was conducted at the end of 
                                                 
48 In order of appearance: Brigadier William Murphy, “What is Tank Country?” Canadian Army Journal 5, 1 (1951): 
22-28; Lt. Col. William R. Kintner, “Don’t Jump to Tanks,” Canadian Army Journal 5, 2 (1951): 23-35 (reprinted from 
United States Army Combat Journal); Lt.-Gen. Sir Giffard Martel, “This Universal Tank Controversy,” Canadian Army 
Journal 5, 2 (1951): 62-64 (reprinted from The British Army Journal); and Lieut. T.R. Pickett, Jr., “Tank-Infantry Team At 
Work,” Canadian Army Journal 5, 3 (1951): 6-11 (reprinted from ARMOR [US]). 
49 William W. Epley, America’s First Cold War Army 1945-1950 (Arlington, VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, 
Association of the United States Army, 1999), 15. 
50 Lt.-Col. R.T. Bennett, “The Canadian Army Staff College Course, 1948,” Royal Military College of Canada Review 
and Log of H.M.S. Stone Frigate XXIX, 52 (1948): 43. 
51 DND, DHH, 80/71, 12, 37, Volume 11 UNITED STATES ARMY, CASC 1949 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY 
STAFF COLLEGE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO UNITED STATES ARMY SERIALS,” January 1949, 1-2. 
52 Ibid., 23, 64, Volume 6 INTELLIGENCE United States Armed Forces Soviet Aamed[sic] Forces FUTURE 
WARFARE, CASC 1952 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO US ARMED 
FORCES SERIES,” May 1952, 1. 
53 Ibid., 38, 94, Volume 5 SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE US ARMED FORCES, CASC 1955 COURSE, “CANADIAN 
ARMY STAFF COLLEGE US ARMED FORCES 42 THE US COMMAND & GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE GUEST 
LECTURE,” April 1955. 
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the series and students were provided a CGSC document on the organization and characteristics of the 
US infantry division with which they solved the exercise’s problems.54 
The most important studies were those on US Army infantry divisions and logistics. The division was 
the largest army unit covered in detail because it was the smallest formation “composed of all the 
essential ground arms and services” that allowed it on its own “to maintain combat over a considerable 
period of time.”55 More significantly, the infantry division was “the basis of organization” of US Army 
field forces56 as it had been for Canadian ground forces during the Second World War when First 
Canadian Army had included three infantry divisions. Then the Canadian Army downsized and the 
numbers for even one division were unattainable until the onset of the Korean War. The army’s 
subsequent expansion, and the creation of the two infantry brigade groups for UN and NATO forces, 
held out hope for a full-strength Canadian infantry division for operational service. Meanwhile, in 
Kingston, student officers were asked to outline the features of the US infantry division that they believed 
should be considered, or “experimented with,” for inclusion in a Canadian infantry division.57 
Students also learned, through précis and lectures, about the role of the G-4 Logistics Section of the 
General Staff and the US Army’s system of administration, supply, evacuation, and maintenance.58 The 
G-4 section handled these responsibilities; on the Canadian staff, they fell to the administrative branch 
under the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General. Similar to the AA & QMG, the G-4 chief at the 
division level normally held the rank of lieutenant-colonel.59 Students were tested on these studies: one 
year they were given a series of questions related to the responsibilities of a division G-4 whose formation 
had joined the X Corps under First US Army. The questions covered the preparation of the administrative 
plan necessary for the transfer of the division from a rest area to the front line, coordination with other 
units’ G-4s, and the requisitioning of different classes of supplies.60 
In all of their studies on the US Army, student officers compared the American subject matter with 
Canadian counterparts61 to bring out the “essential difference” among given doctrine, units, and staff 
duties, particularly within divisions and corps.62 To that end, students were commonly tested with 
questions such as the following, from the first post-war series in 1946: 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 19, 53, Volume 5 INTELLIGENCE US ARMED FORCES SOVIET ARMED FORCES FUTURE WARFARE, 
CASC 1951 COURSE, “COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE, ORGANIZATION AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION Advance Sheet,” 24 August 1950, 1-4.  
55 Ibid., 9, 26, Volume 12, CASC 1948 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY 2 
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES INFANTRY DIVISION,” n.d., 1.  
56 Ibid., “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY - 4 QUESTIONNAIRE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION AND REGIMENT [DS SOLUTION],” January 1948, 1. 
57 Ibid., “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY – 4 QUESTIONNAIRE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE INFANTRY DIVISION AND REGIMENT,” January 1948, 1. 
58 DND, DHH, 80/71, 3, 12, Volume 12 TRAINING UNITED STATES ARMY WINTER WARFARE, CASC 1946-7 
COURSE, “CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY 18 G-4 (LOGISTICS) SECTION,” September 
1946, 1-2; and Ibid., “CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY - 19 THE SPECIAL STAFF AND 
LOGISTICS,” October 1946, 8-10.  
59 For a schematic comparison of Canadian and US division headquarters staffs in 1945, see “Canadian Infantry 
Division Headquarters January 1945,” in Macdonald, In Search of Veritable, 38, fig. 14; and “U.S. DIVISION 
HEADQUARTERS 1945,” in ibid., Appendix I, “INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND STAFFS,” 255, fig. 24. 
60 DND, DHH, 80/71, 3, 12, Volume 12, CASC 1946-7 COURSE, “CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES 
ARMY 22 SPECIAL STAFF AND LOGISTICS QUESTIONNAIRE,” October 1946, 1-2. 
61 Ibid., 15, 43, Volume 5 CHEM. WARFARE INTELLIGENCE US ARMED FORCES SOVIET ARMY, CASC 1950 
COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE STUDENTS' GUIDE TO US ARMED FORCES SERIES,” January 
1950, 1. 
62 Ibid., 26, 70, Volume 1 SERIES BRIEFS 1953 OUTLINE BLOCK SYLLABUS 1953 PROVISIONAL TIME-TABLE 
WEEKLY TIME-TABLE ORDER OF BATTLE AND ADDRESS GROUP, NET IDENTIFICATION SIGN AND CALL 
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1. Compare the strengths of the following units in the US Inf[antry] 
Div[ision] and the Cdn equivalents. 
a. Div[ision] H[ead]q[uarters] Co[mpany]. 
b. Inf[antry] component. 
c. Sig[nals] Co[mpany]. 
d. M[ilitary] P[olice] Co[mpany]. 
e. Q[uarter]M[aster] Co[mpany]. 
f. A[nti-]T[ank] component.63 
 
This theme was constant, as illustrated by this similar question from the mid-1950s: 
 
3. Outline and compare the organization of a Canadian Infantry 
Brigade Group which is equivalent to a US Regimental Combat 
Team (RCT) consisting of: 
(a) Inf[antry] Reg[imen]t. 
(b) Art[iller]y B[attalio]n (105 mm How[itzer]). 
(c) Anti-aircraft B[at]t[e]ry (40 mm S[elf-] P[ropelled]). 
(d) Eng[inee]r (C) Co[mpany]. 
(e) Platoon, Div[ision] Clearing Co[mpany]. 
(f) Platoon, Div[ision] Ambulance Co[mpany]. 
(g) Det[achment], (Plat[oon]) Div[ision] Sig[nals] Co[mpany]. 
(h) Det[achment], Plat[oon]) Div[ision] Q[uarter]M[aster] 
Co[mpany]. 
(j)[sic] Det[achment], (Plat[oon]) Div[ision] Ord[nance] B[attalio]n.64  
 
All of this instruction was facilitated by American officers appointed to the CASC instructional staff. For 
example, Colonel N.P. Ward III, US Army, and Colonel A.F. Penzold, US Marine Corps,65 were 
responsible for coordinating the US Armed Forces series during the early 1950s;66 by 1955, a US infantry 
officer, Colonel W.C. Wickboldt,67 directed Exercise SAMUEL, a Canada-US army map exercise that 
followed the main series.68 
                                                                                                                                                             
SIGN LIST RCAF ORDER OF BATTLE STAFF DATA PHILISTINE ARMED FORCES, CASC 1953 COURSE, “FIRST 
REVISION SC 3201-81/1-22 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCED[sic] SERIES 
DS BRIEF - 1953,” October 1952, 1. 
63 Ibid., 3, 12, Volume 12, CASC 1946-7 COURSE, “CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY - 4 
QUESTIONNAIRE ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY DIVISION AND REGIMENT,” October 1946. 
64 Ibid., 38, 94, Volume 5, CASC 1955 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE US ARMED FORCES 12 
QUESTIONNAIRE - US INFANTRY DIVISION,” April 1955. 
65 See “Directing and Administrative Staff 1952 Course,” Annual Review - Canadian Army Staff College 1, 1 (1952): ix. 
66 DND, DHH, 80/71, 22, 59, Volume 1, CASC 1952 COURSE, “CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES SERIES DS BRIEF,” January 1952, 1; and Ibid., 26, 70, Volume 1, CASC 1953 COURSE, 
“FIRST REVISION SC 3201-81/1-22 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCED[sic] 
SERIES DS BRIEF - 1953,” October 1952, 1. 
67 See “DIRECTING, TRAINING AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF 1955,” Snowy Owl 1, 4 (1955): 9. 
68 DND, DHH, 80/71, 37, 90, Volume 1 SERIES BRIEFS PROVISIONAL AND WEEKLY TIME TABLES ORDER OF 
BATTLE AND WIRELESS CALL SIGNS JOINT STUDY TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT TRANSPORT AIR SUPPORT, 
CASC 1955 COURSE, “APPX "G" TO SC 3310-81/1-6 (DS) SC S 3201-81/1-21 (DS) DATED 1 NOV 54,” November 
1954. 
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Exercise SAMUEL represented Canadian Army instructors’ direct attempt to prepare staff officers for 
potential field operations with the Americans. In Exercise SAMUEL’s scenario, US L Corps, under US 
Ninth Army, held a defensive line in England. In advance of a major offensive that involved L Corps, the 
US Ninth Army commander arranged for the 1st Canadian Infantry Division to come under L Corps 
command and replace the US 30th Infantry Division which was “badly in need of rest and refitting.” Prior 
to its transfer, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had been under the command of 1st Canadian Army, 
which held a defensive position 100 miles to the east of the US L Corps line.69 1st Canadian Infantry 
Division was to remain under US Army command for two weeks.70 
Exercise SAMUEL, first part of the CASC curriculum in 1952, was a by-product of the Canadian 
Army’s experience in Korea. In that theatre, Canadian infantry used a mix of Canadian combat clothing 
and personal kit, British small arms, and American mortars, machine guns, radios, and rocket launchers, 
a situation consequent of previous defence budget cuts and US export laws that inhibited the 
standardization of the Canadian Army on American weapons and equipment.71 Therefore, in Korea, 
Canadians drew on three different sources for supply, leading to subsequent “administrative 
headaches.”72 Exercise SAMUEL prepared Canadian staff officers for such headaches by having them 
formulate solutions to potential mutual administrative and supply problems when working with allied 
counterparts.73  
As the DS explained, the differences in operational and intelligence procedures between US and 
Canadian Army formations were not great; this situation had been illustrated during the Second World 
War when, “for two or three weeks in late 1944,” the US Army 104th Infantry Division operated under 
First Canadian Army’s command “without any difficulty.”74 Another appropriate example was the 
aforementioned 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade which served under American command in the north 
Pacific.75 Administration and supply was a different matter, however. In SAMUEL, the 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division, under 1st Canadian Army, was tasked to US L Corps, under US Ninth Army, in 
advance of a US offensive. In the exercise, students had two requirements. The first involved preliminary 
preparations at the Canadian division headquarters, including determining which Canadian and 
American liaison officers were necessary to enable the transfer of 1st Canadian Infantry to US L Corps.76 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 24, 66, Volume 8 OPERATIONS WAR GENERAL OPERATIONS WAR KESTONE[sic] OPERATIONS WAR 
DEFENCE, CASC 1952 COURSE, “SERIAL 2 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS WAR CDN - US 
1 EXERCISE SAMUEL OPENING NARRATIVE,” September 1952. 
70 Ibid., “SERIAL 3 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL 
NARRATIVE 1 AND REQUIREMENT 1,” September 1952. 
71 David J. Bercuson, Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto and Buffalo: University of 
Toronto Press, 1999), 55-56; J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto and Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 323; and Brent B. Watson, Far Eastern Tour: The Canadian Infantry in Korea, 1950-
1953 (Montreal and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 32-46. 
72 Bercuson, Blood on the Hills, 57. 
73 DND, DHH, 80/71, 39, 97, Volume 8 OPERATIONS WAR DEFENCE OPERATIONS WAR GENERAL 
OPERATIONS WAR KEYSTONE CAMPAIGN OPERATIONS WAR CANADIAN – US, CASC 1955 COURSE, 
“SERIAL 4 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL DS NOTES 
- GENERAL AND REQUIREMENT 1,” October 1955, 2. 
74 Ibid., 24, 66, Volume 8, CASC 1952 COURSE, “SERIAL 6 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS 
WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL DS NOTES - REQUIREMENT 2,” September 1952, 1. 
75 Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery, 186-96. 
76 DND, DHH, 80/71, 24, 66, Volume 8, CASC 1952 COURSE, “SERIAL 3 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE 
OPERATIONS WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL NARRATIVE 1 AND REQUIREMENT 1,” September 1952; 
and Ibid., 39, 97, Volume 8, CASC 1955 COURSE, “SERIAL 3 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS 
WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL NARRATIVE 1 AND REQUIREMENT 1,” October 1955.  
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This requirement included a discussion of how this process affected the appropriate staff officers and the 
commanders of the artillery, engineers, signals, medical, and ordnance arms and services in both 
formations.77 The second requirement involved the formulation of an administrative plan for the support 
of 1st Canadian Infantry Division while in the line, which included arrangements with both the 
Americans and 1st Canadian Army.78 
Exercise SAMUEL’s critical lesson involved the role of the AA & QMG. Students had to effectively 
think like this officer who, responsible for all administration and supply in a Canadian division, had to 
coordinate the Canadians’ logistical support with an allied organization that divided this responsibility 
among four different staff sections. Moreover, students learned to approach particular issues from an 
American perspective including the reformulation of Canadian Army documentation into US Army 
format prior to collaboration with US commanders. In that vein, “the crux of the whole problem” for the 
AA & QMG and his staff was to determine the common and non-common items between their division 
and the Americans in order to establish the extent of Canadian supplies to be used versus those from 
American sources prior to the L Corps operation.79 In SAMUEL, students broke down common 
equipment, stores, and weapons according to US Army categorization of supplies.80 In a real situation, 
these lists of required items would be provided to the US G-4 at the army level who was the individual 
responsible for the maintenance of subordinate divisions.81 
Exercise SAMUEL exemplified the development of the early Cold War Canadian Army whose 
Korean experience was fused into this process and heavily influenced SAMUEL’s components. The 
Directing Staff exercise documentation is replete with references to Korea. In terms of finding the 
appropriate number of liaison officers under the scenario offered in SAMUEL, the DS noted that this was 
a “contentious” issue as there never seemed to be enough officers “to do the essential jobs in a normal 
op[eration].” Brigadier-General John Rockingham, commander of 25 CIBG from August 1950 to April 
1952, observed the lack of difficulty in finding additional liaison officers. The DS qualified Rockingham’s 
comments with the fact that they related to liaison officers at the brigade level and were made after 
Rockingham’s units had worked with US forces “for some considerable time,” not two weeks as with the 
Canadian division in SAMUEL.82 
The DS also viewed student officers with Korean War experience as a valuable resource. Whereas 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division’s “ad hoc maint[enance] system” in the exercise was deemed “most 
satisfactory” for the formation’s short stay under US L Corps, for longer periods, relying solely on 
Canadian maintenance requirements was preferable. The DS remarked that: “Students who have served 
in Korea will undoubtedly have ideas on this matter.”83 Lieutenant-Colonel Jacques Dextraze, a battalion 
                                                 
77 Ibid., 24, 66, Volume 8, CASC 1952 COURSE, “SERIAL 4 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS 
WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL DS NOTES - GENERAL AND REQUIREMENT 1,” September 1952, 2-4. 
78 Ibid., “SERIAL 5 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL 
NARRATIVE 2 AND REQUIREMENT 2,” September 1952, 1-2. 
79 DND, DHH, 80/71, 39, 97, Volume 8, CASC 1955 COURSE, “SERIAL 4 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE 
OPERATIONS WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL DS NOTES - GENERAL AND REQUIREMENT 1,” October 
1955, 3. 
80 For a description of the five U.S. Army classes of supplies, see ibid., 3, 12, Volume 12, CASC 1946-7 COURSE, 
“CANADIAN STAFF COLLEGE UNITED STATES ARMY - 19 THE SPECIAL STAFF AND LOGISTICS,” October 
1946, 8. 
81 Ibid., 39, 97, Volume 8, CASC 1955 COURSE, “SERIAL 4 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS 
WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL DS NOTES - GENERAL AND REQUIREMENT 1,” October 1955, 5. 
82 Ibid., 24, 66, Volume 8, CASC 1952 COURSE, “SERIAL 4 CANADIAN ARMY STAFF COLLEGE OPERATIONS 
WAR CDN - US 1 EXERCISE SAMUEL DS NOTES - GENERAL AND REQUIREMENT 1,” September 1952, 7. 
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commander from the Royal 22e Régiment, was one of the Canadian student officers “with a wealth of 
experience” from Korea who was not afraid to share his opinion on the war during the 1952 CASC 
course.84  
Moreover, in the discussion of Requirement 1, which included the AA & QMG’s determination of 
user items, the DS stated in parentheses that “[t]his solution is based on the op[eration]s of the PPCLI 
under the com[man]d of a BRIT b[riga]de which, in turn, was under [the] com[man]d of a US Div[ision] 
in Korea.”85 This latter comment referred to the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry 
regiment’s service in early 1951, as part of the 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade under the 
command of the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division.86 A more apt example was the 1st Commonwealth Division, a 
British command under which the 25 CIBG served, which was part of US I Corps in Korea. However, the 
SAMUEL documentation does not reference the logistical and administrative experiences of the British 
Commonwealth officers whose division worked under a US Army corps command.87 
Other DS notes dealt with medical and equipment issues in Korea. For example, DS instructors 
informed students that, in a joint Canadian-American army operation, the evacuation and hospitalization 
of Canadian casualties would be conducted through “purely” Canadian units because in Korea, Canadian 
casualties evacuated through US channels were often “lost in the machine,” with resultant difficulties in 
tracking their records and kit, and their prompt return to action.88 Moreover, Canadian Army instructors 
recognized the temptations that Canadian officers faced with access to American equipment and 
weapons supplies. This situation had arisen in Korea when Canadian troops unofficially rearmed 
themselves with the American-made semi-automatic Winchester M2 Carbine, better suited to combat 
conditions than the Canadians’ British-made Lee Enfield bolt-action rifle.89 Consequently, in a SAMUEL-
type operation, the DS noted that Canadian units would try to replace “all their eq[ui]p[men]t which is 
NOT ‘perfect’ with new eq[ui]p[men]t, or with some piece of US eq[ui]p[men]t which the unit may 
fancy.” As a result, staff officers at higher headquarters were to control demands for equipment, 
prioritizing those demands that were deemed urgent.90 That many of these Korean references were made 
in September 1952 indicates a fast turnaround between field experiences and their incorporation into 
Canadian Army staff officer education. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Exercise SAMUEL represented more than the adaptation of a Canadian Army division to a US Army 
supply system on the battlefield and the culmination of the CASC studies on US armed forces. The 
exercise illustrated the intellectual process that evolved within the early Cold War Canadian Army, as the 
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army transitioned from a purely British mindset to an Americanized one. The Canadian Army had a long 
history of British Army organization and officer education — the latter heavily oriented towards British 
Army operational and administrative methods — through to the end of the Second World War. During 
that war, however, the tightening Canada-US military relationship filtered down to the extent that, by the 
1950s, Canadian officers expected that they would fight alongside the Americans in the future. This 
expectation required a shift in mentality, which is recognizable in, for example, professional military 
writing. But army journal debates reflected the broader, systematic integration of American doctrine into 
the curriculum at the young Canadian Army Staff College. That the CASC’s organization and curriculum 
were also modelled after British Army institutions, and then incorporated with many American elements, 
is why an analysis of early Cold War Canadian Army staff officer education helps shape our 
understanding of the Americanization of the Canadian Army.  
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